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Maximin Share Guarantees via Limited Cost-Sensitive Sharing
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Maximin Share Guarantees via Limited Cost-Sensitive Sharing

#maximin share #fair allocation #indivisible goods #cost-sensitive sharing #multi-agent systems #algorithmic fairness #resource distribution #game theory

📌 Key Takeaways

  • Researchers developed theoretical framework for fair allocation with limited sharing
  • Shared Bag-Filling Algorithm provides approximate MMS guarantees
  • New SMMS fairness concept extends classic MMS to k-sharing settings
  • Exact MMS allocations proven possible under specific conditions
  • Research bridges game theory and practical resource allocation systems

📖 Full Retelling

Researchers Hana Salavcova, Martin Černý, and Arpita Biswas published a paper titled 'Maximin Share Guarantees via Limited Cost-Sensitive Sharing' on arXiv on February 24, 2026, addressing the challenge of fairly allocating indivisible goods when limited sharing is permitted among multiple agents. The paper explores scenarios where each good can be allocated to up to k agents while incurring a sharing cost, demonstrating that controlled sharing can restore fairness guarantees that are otherwise unattainable in certain resource allocation problems. This research was prepared for presentation at the 25th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2026) in Paphos, Cyprus, scheduled for May 25-29, 2026. The core problem addressed is that classic maximin share (MMS) allocations often do not exist in many real-world scenarios involving indivisible goods. The researchers introduce the concept of cost-sensitive sharing, where goods can be shared among multiple agents but at a computational cost. Their theoretical framework bridges game theory and artificial intelligence, offering new algorithms and fairness concepts for multi-agent environments where resources cannot be perfectly divided. The study provides both theoretical guarantees and practical algorithms that can be implemented in various resource allocation systems. The paper makes six significant contributions: first, it proves that exact MMS allocations exist when goods can be shared among at least half of agents with even numbers; second, it introduces a Shared Bag-Filling Algorithm that guarantees a (1 - C)(k - 1)-approximate MMS allocation; third, it proposes the Sharing Maximin Share (SMMS) fairness notion; fourth, it demonstrates SMMS allocations always exist with identical utilities and two-agent scenarios; fifth, it presents a counterexample showing SMMS allocations don't universally exist; and sixth, it establishes connections between SMMS and constrained MMS for approximation guarantees. This research has significant implications for various fields including economics, artificial intelligence, and distributed systems, where fair resource allocation is critical. The findings enable more practical implementation of fair division principles in real-world scenarios where perfect division of resources is impossible, potentially improving outcomes in everything from cloud computing resource allocation to fair division of physical assets among multiple stakeholders.

🏷️ Themes

Fair Division, Resource Allocation, Multi-agent Systems, Game Theory

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Original Source
--> Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory arXiv:2602.20541 [Submitted on 24 Feb 2026] Title: Maximin Share Guarantees via Limited Cost-Sensitive Sharing Authors: Hana Salavcova , Martin Černý , Arpita Biswas View a PDF of the paper titled Maximin Share Guarantees via Limited Cost-Sensitive Sharing, by Hana Salavcova and 1 other authors View PDF HTML Abstract: We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods when limited sharing is allowed, that is, each good may be allocated to up to $k$ agents, while incurring a cost for sharing. While classic maximin share allocations may not exist in many instances, we demonstrate that allowing controlled sharing can restore fairness guarantees that are otherwise unattainable in certain scenarios. (1) Our first contribution shows that exact maximin share allocations are guaranteed to exist whenever goods are allowed to be cost-sensitively shared among at least half of the agents and the number of agents is even; for odd numbers of agents, we obtain a slightly weaker MMS guarantee. (2) We further design a Shared Bag-Filling Algorithm that guarantees a $(1 - C)(k - 1)$-approximate MMS allocation, where $C$ is the maximum cost of sharing a good. Notably, when $(1 - C)(k - 1) \geq 1$, our algorithm recovers an exact MMS allocation. (3) We additionally introduce the Sharing Maximin Share fairness notion, a natural extension of MMS to the $k$-sharing setting. (4) We show that SMMS allocations always exist under identical utilities and for instances with two agents. (5) We construct a counterexample to show the impossibility of the universal existence of an SMMS allocation. (6) Finally, we establish a connection between SMMS and constrained MMS , yielding approximation guarantees for SMMS via existing CMMS results. These contributions provide deep theoretical insights for the problem of fair resource allocation when a limited sharing of resources are allowed in multi-agent environments. Comments: In Proc. of the...
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